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Abstract
SOBA is an approach to election verification that pro-
vides observers with justifiably high confidence that the
reported results of an election are consistent with an audit
trail (“ballots”), which can be paper or electronic. SOBA
combines three ideas: (1) publishing cast vote records
(CVRs) separately for each contest, so that anyone can
verify that each reported contest outcome is correct, if
the CVRs reflect voters’ intentions with sufficient accu-
racy; (2) shrouding a mapping between ballots and the
CVRs for those ballots to prevent the loss of privacy that
could occur otherwise; (3) assessing the accuracy with
which the CVRs reflect voters’ intentions for a collection
of contests while simultaneously assessing the integrity
of the shrouded mapping between ballots and CVRs by
comparing randomly selected ballots to the CVRs that
purport to represent them. Step (1) is related to work
by the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project,
but publishing CVRs separately for individual contests
rather than images of entire ballots preserves privacy.
Step (2) requires a cryptographic commitment from elec-
tions officials. Observers participate in step (3), which
relies on the “super-simple simultaneous single-ballot
risk-limiting audit.” Step (3) is designed to reveal rel-
atively few ballots if the shrouded mapping is proper and
the CVRs accurately reflect voter intent. But if the re-
ported outcomes of the contests differ from the outcomes
that a full hand count would show, step (3) is guaranteed
to have a large chance of requiring all the ballots to be
counted by hand, thereby limiting the risk that an incor-
rect outcome will become official and final.
1 Introduction and background
The majority of Americans now vote electronically, ei-
ther on machine-counted paper ballots or on Direct
Recording Electronic (DRE) machines. Electronic vot-
ing offers advantages over hand counts and lever ma-
chines, but it poses challenges for determining whether
votes were recorded and counted correctly. A wide range
of security vulnerabilities and other flaws have been doc-
umented in contemporary voting equipment. The 2007
“Top-to-Bottom Review” of the systems used in Califor-
nia found that all the systems had “serious design flaws”
and “specific vulnerabilities, which attackers could ex-
ploit to affect election outcomes” [Bowen, 2007]. While
some of these vulnerabilities can be mitigated, the under-
lying verification challenge is formidable. As Rivest and
Wack comment, “complexity is the enemy of security,”
and demonstrating that any complex system is free of
faults may be impossible or infeasible [Rivest and Wack,
2006].
Electronic voting systems have failed in real elec-
tions. In the 2004 general election in Carteret County,
North Carolina, over 4,000 votes were lost irretriev-
ably due to a programming error that affected UniLect
Patriot voting machines, casting doubt on a statewide
election outcome [Bonner, 2004]. More controversially,
in the 2006 general election, ES&S iVotronic DREs
in Sarasota County, Florida did not record a vote for
U.S. House for about 15% of voters—far more than can
plausibly be attributed to intentional undervoting. Inad-
vertent undervotes were probably decisive in that con-
test [Ash and Lamperti, 2008; Mebane and Dill, 2007].
Hypotheses explaining these undervotes include voter
confusion caused by poor ballot layout [Frisina et al.,
2008] and machine failure [Garber, 2008; Mebane,
2009]. Unfortunately, the forensic evidence generated
by the voting systems was inadequate to determine the
cause of the undervotes or the intentions of the voters.
Voter-marked paper ballots provide a clearer record
of what voters did and more evidence about voter in-
tent, but by themselves do not solve the election verifica-
tion problem. In 2005, Harri Hursti repeatedly demon-
strated the ability to “hack” optical scan counts when
given access to a memory card [Zetter, 2005]. In a June
2006 primary election in Pottawattamie County, Iowa,
incorrectly configured optical scanners miscounted ab-
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sentee ballots in every contest, altering two outcomes.
The county auditor ordered a hand recount, which cor-
rected the errors [Flaherty, 2006]. Similar errors in other
elections may have altered outcomes without ever being
detected. Even when scanners work correctly, their re-
sults may differ materially from voter intent. Consider
the 2006 U.S. Senate contest in Minnesota, where Al
Franken beat Norm Coleman in a hand recount largely
because of ballots where the human interpretation dif-
fered from the machine interpretation.1
1.1 Software independence
Computerized election equipment cannot be infallible,
so Rivest and Wack [2006] and Rivest [2008] suggest
that voting systems should be software-independent. A
voting system is software-independent “if an undetected
change or error in its software cannot cause an unde-
tectable change or error in an [apparent] election out-
come.” This idea can be generalized to define indepen-
dence from hardware and from elections personnel, lead-
ing to so-called end-to-end verifiable election technolo-
gies. However, end-to-end technology may require fun-
damental changes in current voting processes.
The outcome of a contest is the set of winners, not the
exact vote counts. The apparent outcome of a contest
is the winner or winners according to the voting system.
The correct outcome of a contest is the winner or win-
ners that a full hand count of the “audit trail” would find.
The audit trail is assumed to be an indelible record of
how voters cast their votes. It might consist of a com-
bination of voter-marked paper ballots, voter receipts, a
voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), and suitable
electronic records.
This definition of “correct” is generally a matter of
law. It does not necessarily imply that the audit trail
is inviolate (nor that the outcome according to the audit
trail is the same as the outcome according to how voters
originally cast their ballots); that there is no controversy
about which records in the audit trail reflect valid votes;
that human observers agree on the interpretation of the
audit trail; that the actual hand counting is accurate; nor
that repeating the hand count would give the same an-
swer. If there is no audit trail, defining what it means for
the apparent outcome to be correct requires hypothetical
counterfactuals—but for the fault in the voting system,
what would the outcome have been?
Software independence means that errors that cause
apparent outcomes to be wrong leave traces in the audit
trail. But software independence does not guarantee any
of the following:
1The 2000 presidential election may have been decided by differ-
ences between the machine interpretation of certain Florida optical scan
ballots and the likely human interpretation [Keating, 2002].
1. that no such traces will occur if the apparent out-
come is correct2
2. that those traces will be noticed or acted upon
3. that the cost of looking through the audit trail for
those traces is affordable
4. that, in principle, there is a way to correct the appar-
ent outcome without holding another election
5. that, in practice, the audit trail was preserved and
protected well enough to determine the outcome ac-
cording to how the voters originally cast their bal-
lots
The penultimate property is guaranteed by strong soft-
ware independence. Rivest and Wack [2006] and Rivest
[2008] define a voting system to be strongly software-
independent if an undetected change or error in its soft-
ware cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an
[apparent] election outcome, and moreover, a detected
change or error in an [apparent] election outcome (due to
change or error in the software) can be corrected without
re-running the election. Having an audit trail does not
guarantee that anyone will dig through it to see whether
there is a problem or to correct the outcome if the out-
come is wrong. Strong software independence does not
correct anything, but it is an essential ingredient for a
system to be self-correcting.
Compliance audits can be used to assess whether the
last property listed above holds: Given that the election
used a strongly software-independent voting system, did
it adhere to procedures that should keep the audit trail
sufficiently accurate to reconstruct the outcome accord-
ing to how voters cast their ballots? Strong evidence that
such procedures were followed is strong evidence that
the legally correct outcome—what a full hand count of
the audit trail would show—is the same as the outcome
according to how the voters originally cast their ballots.
As we discuss below in section 4, we believe that com-
pliance audits should always be required: If the election
fails the compliance audit,3 there is no assurance that
even a full hand count of the audit trail would show the
outcome according to how the voters really voted. Be-
low, we assume that the election has passed a compliance
audit.
2False alarms are possible. An analogy is that if a tamper-evident
seal shows that a package has been opened, it does not follow that the
package contents have been altered.
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“Failure” means failure to find strong evidence that such proce-
dures were followed, rather than finding evidence that such procedures
were not followed.
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1.2 Vote tabulation audits
Vote tabulation audits compare reported vote subtotals
for subsets of ballots (“audit units”) with hand counts of
the votes for each of those subsets. Audit units have to be
subsets for which the voting system reports vote subto-
tals. Most present U.S. audits use audit units that consist
of all the ballots cast in individual precincts or all the bal-
lots tabulated on individual voting machines. Generally,
audit laws do not have provisions that would lead to cor-
recting incorrect electoral outcomes [Hall et al., 2009].4
A risk-limiting post-election audit uses the au-
dit trail to guarantee that there is a large, pre-
specified probability that the audit will correct the
apparent outcome if the apparent outcome is wrong.
Risk-limiting audits are widely considered best prac-
tice [Lindeman et al., 2008]. Risk-limiting audits have
been endorsed by the American Statistical Associa-
tion [American Statistical Association, 2010], the Bren-
nan Center for Justice, Common Cause, the League of
Women Voters, and Verified Voting, among others. Cal-
ifornia AB 2023 (2010), requires a pilot of risk-limiting
audits in 2011 [Saldan˜a, 2010]. Colorado Revised
Statutes §1-7-515 calls for implementing risk-limiting
audits by 2014.
The first method for conducting risk-limiting
audits was proposed by Stark [2008a]; numer-
ous improvements have been made [Stark, 2008b,
2009b,d,c; Miratrix and Stark, 2009; Stark, 2010b]. See
also [Checkoway et al., 2010]. Risk-limiting audits limit
the risk of failing to correct an outcome that is wrong.
The risk limit is 100% minus the minimum chance that
the audit corrects the outcome. If the outcome is correct
in the first place, a risk-limiting audit cannot make it
wrong; but if the outcome is wrong, a risk-limiting
audit has a large chance of correcting it. Hence, the
probability that the outcome according to a risk-limiting
audit is the correct outcome is at least 100% minus the
risk limit.
For systems that are strongly software-independent,
adding a risk-limiting audit addresses the second condi-
tion above: It ensures a large, pre-specified probability
that the traces will be noticed and will be used to correct
the apparent outcome if the apparent outcome is wrong.
1.3 Our goal
Our goal in this work is to sketch a personally verifiable
privacy-preserving P-resilient canvass framework. We
must first say what this means.
4For instance, under New York law, each county determines inde-
pendently whether its audit in a particular contest must be expanded.
This provision means that a correct outcome might be changed to an
incorrect outcome even if the conduct of the audit is formally flawless.
A canvass framework consists of the vote-tabulation
system together with other human, hardware, software,
and procedural components of the canvass, including
compliance and vote-tabulation audits. A canvass frame-
work is resilient with probability P or P-resilient if the
probability that the outcome it gives5 is the correct out-
come is at least P, even if its software has an error, short-
coming, or undetected change.6 Resilience means that
the framework tends to recover from faults. If a can-
vass framework is P-resilient, either the outcome it gives
when all is said and done is correct, or something oc-
curred that had probability less than 1−P. The canvass
framework that results from performing a risk-limiting
audit on a strongly software-independent voting system
that passes a compliance audit is P-resilient, with P equal
to 100% minus the risk limit. If the system fails the com-
pliance audit, the framework should not declare any out-
come. Instead, the election should be re-run.
Even if a canvass framework is P-resilient, in prac-
tice the public might not trust the system unless they
can observe crucial steps, especially the audit. The mere
right or opportunity to observe the audit will not engen-
der much trust if—as a practical matter—no single per-
son or small group could observe all the steps that are
essential to ensuring the accuracy of the final result. For
instance, if a vote-tabulation audit takes ten teams of au-
ditors working in separate offices four days to complete,
it would take a large team of independent observers—
with lots of free time and long attention spans—to verify
that the audit was carried out correctly. The longer an
audit takes and the more people required to carry out the
audit, the more opportunities there are to damage the au-
dit trail, and the harder it is for an observer to be satisfied
that the audit has been conducted correctly.
We define a canvass framework to be personally verifi-
able P-resilient if it is P-resilient and a single individual
could, as a practical matter, observe enough of the pro-
cess to have convincing evidence that the canvass frame-
work is in fact P-resilient.
The transparency required for a canvass framework to
be personally verifiable can impact privacy. For instance,
publishing images of all the ballots cast in an election7
might give the individuals compelling evidence that the
vote tabulation system found the correct outcome, since
the images allow people to count the votes themselves—
5As discussed in section 4, to be P-resilient, a canvass framework
should refrain from giving any outcome at all if some preconditions are
not met.
6The probability comes from the overall voting system, in our case
from the fact that the audit relies on a random sample. The probabil-
ity does not come from treating votes, voters, or election outcomes as
random, for instance.
7There also needs to be proof that the images are sufficiently com-
plete and accurate to determine the correct outcome.
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at least to the extent that voter intent is unambiguous.8
But publishing ballot images can facilitate vote-selling
and coercion and can compromise privacy, because vot-
ers can deliberately or accidentally reveal their identities
through marks on the ballots including idiosyncrasies of
how individuals fill in bubbles [Calandrino et al., 2011]
or even the fiber structure of the paper on which the bal-
lot is printed [Calandrino et al., 2009].9
A lesser but substantial degree of transparency is
conferred by publishing cast vote records (CVRs)10
enabling anyone to verify that the contest outcomes
are correct—if the CVRs are accurate. However,
as Popoveniuc and Stanton [2007] and Rescorla [2009]
point out, publishing CVRs also can aid vote-selling or
coercion because of the potential for pattern voting. One
typical sample ballot (from Tulsa, Oklahoma) contains
18 contests with over 589,000 possible combinations if
a voter votes in every contest, or over 688 million com-
binations allowing for undervotes. Thus, a voter could
be instructed to vote for the preferred candidate in one
contest, and to cast a series of other votes that would al-
most certainly (especially within a precinct), confirm the
voter’s identity if all of the voter’s selections were pub-
lished. Hence, publishing whole-ballot CVRs for large
numbers of ballots improves transparency but can sacri-
fice privacy.
When there is not strong evidence that the apparent
outcome is correct, risk-limiting audits can require ex-
amining the entire audit trail, potentially exposing all the
ballots to public scrutiny.11 If the apparent outcome is
wrong, such exposure is necessary in order to correct
the outcome. Therefore, if a risk-limiting audit is to
be personally verifiable, there may be occasions where
compromising privacy is unavoidable. But minimizing
the number of ballots or whole-ballot CVRs that are
routinely exposed helps protect privacy, impeding vote-
8Verification methods like Humboldt County Election Transparency
Project (see below) involve publishing digital images of all the ballots.
9There are arguments that images of ballots should be published
anyway—that transparency is more important than privacy. In juris-
dictions that permit voting by mail, there is an opportunity to confirm
how someone votes for the purpose of vote-selling or coercion; indeed,
someone could fill out another’s ballot. Whether publishing images of
ballots would change the rate of vote-selling or coercion substantially
is the subject of some debate.
10In the 2002 FEC Voting System Stan-
dards [Federal Election Commission, 2002], these were
called “ballot images”; however, the term CVR has been
used in more recent EAC Voluntary Voting System Guide-
lines [Election Assistance Commission, 2005]; we prefer the latter
term because it does not suggest an actual image but rather a record of
the interpretation of the system’s interpretation of the ballot. And what
matters is the system’s interpretation of the ballot as a set of votes.
11One could have a risk-limiting audit that, if it had not terminated
after some fraction of the ballots had been examined, triggered a hand
count of the remaining ballots, but did not allow the public to observe
that hand count. But then why should the public trust that the hand
count was accurate?
selling and coercion.
We define a canvass framework to be personally ver-
ifiable privacy-preserving P-resilient if it is personally
verifiable P-resilient and it does not sacrifice privacy un-
necessarily. Neither personally verifiable nor privacy-
preserving is a mathematically precise characteristic,
while P-resilience is.
The contribution of the present work is to sketch a
personally verifiable privacy-preserving P-resilient vot-
ing system. We assume, as a foundation for building
this system, that we are starting with a strongly software-
independent voting system with an audit trail that corre-
sponds to individual ballots. Moreover, we assume that a
compliance audit has determined that the audit trail gen-
erated by the system is sufficiently trustworthy to reflect
the correct outcomes of the contests. We augment the
system with procedures and data structures that make it
possible for an individual observer to gain compelling
evidence that either the outcomes are correct, or some-
thing very unlikely occurred—that is, that the overall
canvass framework is P-resilient. Unless some of the
apparent outcomes are wrong or a margin is extremely
small, gathering that evidence will generally involve ex-
posing only a tiny percentage of ballots and whole-ballot
CVRs.
In essence, our method adds a special risk-limiting
audit to a strongly software-independent voting system
(one that has had a compliance audit to ensure that its
audit trail is intact). Since one person cannot be in two
places at the same time, the procedure cannot be person-
ally verifiable if it involves auditing a multi-jurisdictional
contest in different jurisdictions simultaneously; it would
then be necessary to trust confederates to observe what is
happening elsewhere. The next few sections outline ele-
ments of this risk-limiting audit.
2 Ballot-level risk-limiting audits
One key to keeping the process personally verifiable (by
keeping amount of observation required low) and to pro-
tecting privacy (by exposing as few ballots as possible
to observers) is to audit the record at the level of indi-
vidual ballots, rather than large batches of ballots such
as precincts. The fewer ballots there are in each audit
unit, the smaller the expected counting burden for risk-
limiting audits tends to be—when the electoral outcome
is correct (see, e.g., [Stark, 2009a, 2010a,b]). A vote-
tabulation audit based on checking the CVRs of individ-
ual ballots against a human interpretation of those ballots
is often called a “ballot-level audit,” a “single-ballot au-
dit,” or a “ballot-based audit.” Because they reduce the
time it takes to audit and the number of ballots involved,
ballot-level risk-limiting audits are especially amenable
to personal verification.
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Ballot-level audits are extremely efficient statistically,
but they are not simple to implement using current vot-
ing systems. To perform a ballot-level audit, there must
be a way to identify each ballot uniquely, for instance,
a serial number on a paper ballot, or identifying the bal-
lot by its location: “the 17th ballot in deck 152 scanned
by scanner C,” for instance.12 There must also be a way
to match each ballot to its CVR. Some commercial vot-
ing systems do not generate or do not store CVRs for
individual ballots. Other voting systems record individ-
ual CVRs, but are designed make it difficult or impos-
sible to match individual CVRs to the ballots they pur-
port to represent. In some cases, audit trails have identi-
fiers that can be used to find the corresponding CVRs;
this method was used for part of a 2008 audit in Ea-
gle County, Colorado [Branscomb, 2008]13 and a ballot-
level risk-limiting audit in Orange County, California, in
2011 [P.B. Stark, personal communication, 2011]. How-
ever, to protect privacy, most paper ballots do not have
identification numbers. In a 2009 pilot ballot-level audit
in Yolo County, California, Stark [2009c] exploited the
fact that the CVRs and the physical ballots were in the
same order. The scanned images associated with each
CVR in the audit sample were compared with the physi-
cal ballots to check the accuracy of the CVRs.
Calandrino et al. [2007] describe an approach to elec-
tion verification that involves imprinting ballots with
identification numbers and scanning the ballots with a
“parallel” system in addition to the system of record.
The parallel system derives its own CVRs, from which
the apparent contest outcome can be determined inde-
pendently. The accuracy of the unofficial CVRs and of
the imprinting process is then assessed by a ballot-level
audit.
Since 2008, the Humboldt County Election Trans-
parency Project (Humboldt County ETP) has experi-
mented with publishing ballot images and independently
tabulating CVRs extracted from those images. Using
commercially available equipment, Humboldt County
ETP rescans paper ballots after embossing them with
serial numbers. Then, open-source software is used to
form CVRs from the digital images. Humboldt County
ETP has processed ballots for six elections and published
scanned ballot images as well as its version of the CVRs
for some of them. The results based on their re-scans
12If an identifier is printed on paper ballots, the printing should occur
after the voter casts his or her vote and the ballots are co-mingled. If
the identifier is printed before the voter casts his or her vote, privacy
could be compromised.
13Optical-scan ballots as well as DRE paper audit trails can have
identifiers. For instance, in Boulder County, Colorado, the Hart Ballot
Now system is configured to print unique identifiers and bar codes on
each ballot. In Orange County, California, ballots for the Hart Ballot
Now system have non-unique identifiers and bar codes (numbered 1–
2500, then repeating).
generally have agreed well with the original results, with
one important exception: The Humboldt County ETP
analysis of the November 2008 election uncovered a de-
fect in the election management software that led the re-
sults of an entire ballot batch to be silently discarded!
The Clear Ballot Group, inspired in part by Humboldt
County ETP, is developing a system that, in its words,
could permit election outcomes to be “thoroughly and
transparently verified within 36–48 hours after the polls
close.” Neither the Humboldt County ETP nor Clear
Ballot Group currently incorporate risk-limiting audits,14
but the parallel scans their systems perform facilitate
ballot-level risk-limiting audits, along the general lines
proposed by Calandrino et al. [2007]. If the system of
record and the parallel system agree on the set of win-
ners, a risk-limiting audit of the parallel system transi-
tively confirms the outcome according to the system of
record.15
3 A privacy-preserving audit
The method we propose here presupposes that CVRs are
available, either from the system of record or from a par-
allel system. It publishes all the data contained in the
CVRs in a form that (1) still permits all observers to
check the contest outcomes on the assumption that the
CVRs are accurate, (2) does not compromise privacy, and
(3) enables the CVRs to be checked against the audit trail
while minimizing the loss of privacy.
In SOBA, election officials make a cryptographic
commitment16 to the full set of CVRs by publishing the
CVRs separately for each contest, disaggregating the bal-
lots (we call these contest-CVRs or CCVRs in contrast to
whole-ballot CVRs), and a shrouded link between each
CCVR and the ballot it purports to represent. Splitting
the CVRs into CCVRs and obfuscating the identity of the
ballot from which each CCVR comes eliminates some of
the information required to identify a voter’s ballot style
or to use pattern voting to signal the voter’s identity.17
This makes the procedure privacy-preserving. But it re-
tains enough information for any observer to check that
14Clear Ballot Group is adding support for risk-limiting audits to
their software [L. Moore, personal communication, 2011].
15This is true as long as the systems agree on the set of winners,
even if they disagree about vote totals or margins. For instance, suppose
candidate A defeats candidate B by one percentage point in the original
returns, and by ten points according to the parallel system. Such a large
discrepancy might justify close scrutiny, but a risk-limiting audit of the
results of the parallel system would still provide strong evidence that A
defeated B, or would lead to a full hand count to set the record straight.
16See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commitment_scheme .
Cryptographic commitments have two important properties, the bind-
ing property and the hiding property, discussed in section 3.2.
17Of course, if there is a contest in which few voters are eligible to
vote, eligibility itself is a signal.
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the apparent outcome agrees with the outcome accord-
ing to the CCVRs, for each contest. That is, there is a
known algorithm (the winner algorithm18) that observers
can apply to the published CCVRs to calculate the cor-
rect outcome of every contest—provided the CCVRs re-
flect the ballots (more generally, audit trail) accurately
enough. This is part of making the procedure personally
verifiable. Loosely speaking, the required level of accu-
racy depends on the number of CVRs that must have er-
rors for the apparent outcome to be wrong:19 The fewer
ballots that need to be changed to affect the outcome,
the larger the sample generally will need to be to attain
a given level of confidence that the apparent outcome is
correct.
The CCVRs might fail to be sufficiently accurate be-
cause
• At least one CCVR and the ballot it purports to rep-
resent do not match because human and machine in-
terpretations of voter intent differ (for instance, be-
cause the voter marked the ballot improperly). This
is a failure of the generation of CCVRs.
• At least one CCVR does not in fact correspond to
any ballot. It is an “orphan.” This is a failure of the
mapping between ballots and CCVRs.
• More than one CCVR for the same contest is
mapped to the same ballot. It is a “multiple.” This
is also a failure of the mapping between ballots and
CCVRs.
• There is no CCVR corresponding to some voting
opportunity on a ballot.
A failure of the mapping might be the more distressing
source of error, since it is a failure on the part of the
election official, but we must ensure (statistically) that—
together—all sources of error did not combine to cause
the outcome to be wrong. SOBA uses a risk-limiting au-
dit to assess statistically whether the winners according
to the full audit trail differs from the winners according
to the CCVRs, for all contests under audit, taking into ac-
count all sources of error. If the outcome according to the
CCVRs is incorrect, the audit is very likely to proceed to
a full hand count of the audit trail, thereby revealing the
correct outcome. This provides P-resilience.
To make the risk-limiting audit possible, elections of-
ficials are required to publish another file, the ballot style
18For first-past-the-post contests, the winner algorithm just finds
who has the most votes. Other voting schemes, such as instant-runoff
voting (IRV) or ranked choice voting (RCV), have more complicated
winner algorithms.
19In plurality voting, this is the margin or the set of margins between
each (winner, loser) pair. Defining the margins for IRV and calculating
them for a given set of reported results is not simple. See Cary [2011];
Magrino et al. [2011].
file, which contains ballot identifiers and lists the con-
tests each of those ballots contains. It does not contain
the voters’ selections.
The risk-limiting technique we propose is the
super-simple simultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting au-
dit [Stark, 2010b]. It is not the most efficient ballot-
level audit, but the calculations it requires can be done
by hand, increasing transparency. It involves drawing
ballots at random with equal probability; some more ef-
ficient audits require using different probabilities for dif-
ferent ballots, which is harder to implement and to ex-
plain to the public. Moreover, this technique allows a
collection of contests to be audited simultaneously using
the same sample of ballots. That can reduce the number
of randomly selected ballots that must be located, inter-
preted, and compared with CVRs, decreasing the cost
and time required for the audit and thereby increasing
transparency.
The following subsections give more technical detail.
3.1 Data framework and assumptions
We assume that the audit trail consists of one record per
ballot cast. There are C contests we wish to assess. The
contests might be simple measures, measures requiring
a super-majority, multi-candidate contests, or contests of
the form “vote for up to W candidates.”20 We refer to
records in the audit trail as “ballots.” A ballot may be an
actual voter-marked paper ballot, a voter-verifiable paper
audit trail (VVPAT), or a suitable electronic record.
There are N ballots in the audit trail that each con-
tain one or more of the C contests. Each ballot can be
thought of as a list of pairs, one pair for each contest on
that ballot. Each pair identifies a contest and the voter’s
selection(s) in that contest, which might be an undervote
or a vote for one or more candidates or positions. Ex-
amining a ballot by hand reveals all the voter’s selections
on that ballot; we assume that there is no ambiguity in
interpreting each voter’s intentions from the audit trail.
Before the audit starts, the voting system must report
results for each of the C contests. The report for contest
c gives Nc, the total number of ballots cast in contest c
(including undervotes and spoiled ballots), as well as the
number of valid votes for each position or candidate in
contest c. Let M ≡ N1 +N2 + · · ·+NC denote the total
number of voting opportunities on the N ballots. We as-
sume that the compliance audit assures us (e.g., through
ballot accounting) that the reported values of Nc are accu-
rate, and that the audit trail is trustworthy. In the present
work, we do not consider attacks on the audit trail.
20We do not specifically consider instant-runoff voting or ranked-
choice voting here. Risk-limiting methods can be extended to such
voting methods, but the details are complex.
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There is a published “ballot style file.” Each line in the
ballot style file lists a ballot identifier and a list of con-
tests that ballot is supposed to contain. The ballot iden-
tifier uniquely identifies a ballot in the audit trail. The
identifier could be a number that is printed on a paper
ballot or unambiguous instructions for locating the bal-
lot (e.g., the 275th ballot in the 39th deck). There should
be N lines in the file, and the N ballot identifiers should
be unique. Because the ballot style file is published, indi-
vidual can check this for themselves. Moreover, individ-
uals can check whether the number of lines in the ballot
style file that list contest c equals Nc, the total number of
ballots the system reports were cast in contest c.
Before the audit starts, the voting system or a paral-
lel system has produced a CVR for each ballot. These
are not published as whole-ballot CVRs. Rather, the
CVRs are split by contest to make contest-specific CVRs
(CCVRs) that contain voters’ selections in only one con-
test. Each whole-ballot CVR is (supposed to be) split
into as many CCVRs as there are contests on the ballot.
The CCVRs for the contests are published in C files,
one for each contest. The CCVR file for contest c should
contain Nc lines; because this file is published, individu-
als can check this for themselves. Each line in the CCVR
file for contest c lists a voter’s selection and a shrouded
version of the identifier of the ballot that the selection
is supposed to represent. The order of the lines in each
of the C CCVR files should by shuffled (preferably us-
ing random permutations) so that whole CVRs cannot be
reassembled without knowing secret information.21
The public can confirm whether the contest outcomes
according to the CCVR files match the voting system’s
reported outcomes. If they do not match, there should
be a full hand count of any contests with discrepant out-
comes. We assume henceforth that the outcomes do
match, but we do not assume the exact vote totals ac-
cording to the CCVR files match the reported vote totals.
The data include one more file that is not published,
the lookup file. The lookup file contains M lines, one
for each voting opportunity on each ballot. Each line has
three entries: a shrouded ballot identifier, the correspond-
ing unshrouded ballot identifier, and a number (“salt”)
that is used in computing the shrouded identifier from
the unshrouded identifier using a cryptographic commit-
ment function, as described below. (For a review of uses
for cryptography in voting, see Adida [2006].)
The salt on the jth line of the file is denoted u j. Each
line corresponds to a (ballot, contest) pair: We can think
of u j as being uic, the salt used to shroud the identity of
ballot bi in the CCVR file for contest c. The election
official will use this file to convince observers that every
selection on every ballot corresponds to exactly one entry
21For example, each CCVR file could be sorted in order of the
shrouded ballot identifier.
in a CCVR file, and vice versa.
3.2 Shrouding
The method of shrouding ballot identifiers is crucial to
the approach. SOBA requires election officials to cryp-
tographically commit to the value of the ballot identifier
that goes with each CCVR. A cryptographic commitment
ensures that the ballot identifier is secret but indelible:
The election official can, in effect, prove to observers that
a shrouded identifier corresponds to a unique unshrouded
identifier, but nobody can figure out which unshrouded
identifier corresponds to a given shrouded identifier with-
out secret information.
The next few paragraphs describe a suggested instanti-
ation of the cryptographic commitment. We assume that
ballot identifiers all have the same length. If necessary,
this can be achieved by padding identifiers with leading
zeros. The commitment function H() must be disclosed
publicly and fixed for the duration of the election.
Each commitment represents a claim about a voter’s
selection(s) on a given ballot in a given contest. For
each set of selections that any voter made in each con-
test, including undervotes and votes for more than one
candidate, the election official will create a set of com-
mitments. Each commitment designates the ballot iden-
tifier of a ballot that the election official claims contains
that set of selections in that contest. To commit to the
ballot identifier b, the election official selects a secret
“salt” value u22 and computes the commitment value
y = H(b,u). At a later stage, the official can open the
commitment by revealing u and b: Then anyone can ver-
ify that the value y revealed earlier is indeed equal to
H(b,u).
Loosely speaking, a commitment function must have
two properties, the binding property and the hiding
property. The binding property makes it infeasible for
the official to find any pair (b′,u′) 6= (b,u) for which
H(b′,u′) =H(b,u). This provides integrity by helping to
ensure that election officials cannot contrive to have more
than one CCVR for a given contest claim to come from
the same ballot.23 The binding property is crucial for P-
resilience; indeed, the proof of P-resilience requires only
that the commitment have the binding property and that
{Nc}Cc=1 are known.
The hiding property makes it infeasible for anyone
with access only to the shrouded values H(b,u) to learn
anything about which ballot is involved in each commit-
ment. This provides privacy by helping to ensure that
22To protect voter privacy, it must be infeasible to guess the salts:
Each salt should contain many random or pseudo-random bits. For the
commitment to be effective, the length of all salt values should be fixed
and equal. See section 4.
23See step 7 of the proof in section 3.4.
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observers cannot reassemble whole-ballot CVRs from
the CCVR files without extra information. If observers
could reassemble whole-ballot CVRs, that would open a
channel of communication (pattern voting) for coercion
or vote selling. Ballot identifier b may appear in multiple
commitments since a separate commitment is generated
for each candidate selection on each ballot. The hiding
property ensures that those collections of commitments
do not together reveal the value of any b. This is crucial
for the method to be privacy-preserving.
An HMAC (as described in Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standard Publication 198) with a secure hash
function such as SHA-256 (described in Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard Publication 180-2) can be
used to instantiate the commitment function. However,
since each of the parameters of the commitment function
is of fixed length it is more efficient to simply use a cryp-
tographic hash function such as SHA-256 directly. The
length of the ballot identifiers does not matter, as long as
all ballot identifiers in the election have the same length.
We recommend that all salt values have equal length, of
at least 128 bits. Our results do not depend on the partic-
ular commitment function chosen, as long as it has both
the binding and hiding properties.24
We now describe how to perform a risk-limiting audit
that simultaneously checks the accuracy of the CCVRs,
whether each CCVR entry comes from exactly one bal-
lot, and whether every voting opportunity on every ballot
is reflected in the correct CCVR file.
3.3 The audit
The first three steps check the consistency of the CCVRs
with the reported results and the uniqueness of the
shrouded identifiers.
1. Verify that, for each contest c, there are Nc entries
in the CCVR file for contest c.
2. Verify that, for each contest c, the CCVR file shows
the same outcome as the reported outcome.
3. Verify that the M = N1 + · · ·+NC shrouded ballot
identifiers in all C CCVR files are unique.
If step 2 shows a different outcome for one or more con-
tests, those contests (at least) should be completely hand
counted.
Steps 4 and 5 check the logical consistency of the bal-
lot style file with the reported results.
4. Verify that, for each contest c, there are Nc entries
in the ballot style file that list the contest.
24Menezes et al. [1996] offers a thorough treatment of hash func-
tions and their use for commitments in applications such as digital sig-
natures.
5. Verify that the ballot identifiers in the ballot style
file are unique.
If steps 1, 3, 4, or 5 fail, there has been an error or mis-
representation. The election official needs to correct all
such problems before the audit can start.
The remaining steps comprise the statistical portion of
the risk-limiting audit, which checks whether the CCVRs
and the mapping from ballots to CCVRs is accurate
enough to determine the correct winner.
6. Set the audit parameters:
(a) Choose the risk limit α .
(b) Choose the maximum number of samples D
to draw; if there is not strong evidence that the
outcomes are correct after D draws, the entire
audit trail will be counted by hand.
(c) Choose the “error bound inflator” γ > 1 and
the error tolerance λ ∈ (0,1) for the super-
simple simultaneous method [Stark, 2010b]
(γ = 1.01 and λ = 0.2 are reasonable values).
(d) Calculate
ρ = − logα1
2γ +λ log(1− 12γ )
. (1)
(e) For each of the C contests, calculate the mar-
gin of victory mc in votes from the CCVRs for
contest c.25
(f) Calculate the diluted margin µ : the smallest
value of mc/N among the C contests.26
(g) Calculate the initial sample size n0 = ⌈ρ/µ⌉.
(h) Select a seed s for a pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG).27 Observers and election
officials could contribute input values to s or s
could be generated by an observable, mechan-
ical source of randomness such as rolls of a
10-sided die. The seed should be selected only
once.
7. Draw the initial sample by finding n0 pseudo-
random numbers between 1 and N and audit the cor-
responding ballots:
25This would be replaced by a different calculation for IRV or RCV
contests. See, e.g., Magrino et al. [2011]; Cary [2011].
26The diluted margin controls the sample size. If contest c has the
smallest value of mc/N and Nc is rather smaller than N, it can be more
efficient to audit contest c separately rather than auditing all C contests
simultaneously.
27The code for the PRNG algorithm should be published so that it
can be checked and so that, given the seed s, observers can reproduce
the sequence of pseudo-random numbers. The PRNG should produce
numbers that are statistically indistinguishable from independent ran-
dom numbers uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 (i.e., have large
p-values) for sample sizes up to millions for a reasonable battery of
tests of randomness, such as the Diehard tests.
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(a) Use the PRNG and the seed s to generate n0
pseudo-random numbers, r1,r2, . . . ,rn0 .
(b) Let ℓ j ≡ ⌈Nr j⌉, j = 1, . . . ,n0. This list might
contain repeated values. If so, the tests be-
low only need to be performed once for each
value, but the results count as many times as
the value occurs in the list.28
(c) Find rows ℓ1, . . . , ℓn0 in the ballot style file.
(d) Retrieve the ballots bℓ j in the audit trail iden-
tified by those rows in the ballot style file. If
there is no ballot with identifier bℓ j , pretend in
step 7(g) below that the ballot showed a vote
for the runner-up in every contest listed in that
row of the ballot style file.
(e) Determine whether each ballot shows the
same contests as its corresponding entry in the
ballot style file. If there are any contests on the
ballot that are not in the ballot style file entry,
pretend in step 7(g) below that the CCVR for
that (ballot, contest) pair showed a vote for the
apparent winner of the contest. If there are any
contests in the ballot style file entry that are
not on the ballot, pretend in step 7(g) below
that the ballot showed a vote for the apparent
runner-up for that contest.
(f) For each ballot bℓ j in the sample, the election
official reveals the value of uℓ jc for each con-
test c on the ballot.
(g) For each ballot in the sample, for each contest
on that ballot, observers calculate H(bℓ j ,uℓ jc)
and find the entry in the CCVR file for con-
test c that has that shrouded identifier. If the
shrouded identifier is not in the CCVR file,
pretend that the CCVR file showed that the
voter had selected the apparent winner of con-
test c. Compare the voter’s selection(s) ac-
cording to the CCVR file to the voter’s selec-
tion(s) according to a human reading of ballot
bℓ j . Find eℓ j , the largest number of votes by
which any CCVR for ballot bℓ j overstated the
margin between any (winner, loser) pair in any
contest on ballot bℓ j . This number will be be-
tween −2 and +2.
8. If no ballot in the sample has eℓ j = 2 and no more
than λ µn0 have eℓ j = 1, the audit stops. (In this
calculation, the value of eℓ j should be counted as
many times as ℓ j occurs in the sample.)
9. Otherwise, calculate the Kaplan-Markov P-value,
PKM according to equation (9) in Stark [2009d,c,
28The auditing method relies on sampling with replacement to limit
the risk.
2010b].29 If PKM is less than α , the audit stops. If
PKM is greater than α , the sample is expanded: An-
other random number r j is generated and steps 7(c)–
(g) are repeated. The value of PKM is updated to
include the overstatement errors found in the new
draw.30 This continues until either PKM ≤α or there
have been D draws. In the latter case, all remaining
ballots are counted by hand, revealing the true out-
come.
The next section establishes that this procedure in fact
gives a risk-limiting audit.
3.4 Proof of the risk-limiting property
If the ballot style file is correct and entries in the CCVR
files are mapped properly to voting opportunities on ac-
tual ballots, the only potential source of error is that
CCVR entries do not accurately reflect the voters’ selec-
tions according to a human reading of the ballot. If that
is the case, this is an “ordinary” risk-limiting audit, and
the proof in Stark [2010b] that the super-simple simulta-
neous method is risk-limiting applies directly.
Suppose therefore that the ballot style file or the map-
ping between ballots and CCVRs is faulty. Recall that
the super-simple simultaneous method assumes that no
ballot can overstate any margin by more than 2γ votes,
where γ > 1. There are seven cases to consider.
1. The ballot style file has more than one entry that
corresponds to the same actual ballot, or more than
one actual ballot corresponds to the same entry in
the ballot style file. These faults are precluded by
the uniqueness of the ballot identifiers and of the
recipes for locating the actual ballot with each iden-
tifier.
2. More than one ballot identifier corresponds to the
same shrouded entry (for different values of u). This
is precluded by the binding property of H.
29We consider only plurality voting here: IRV is more complicated.
For each contest c, let Wc be the indices of the apparent winners of the
contest and let Lc be the indices of the apparent losers of the contest.
If w ∈Wc and x ∈Lc, let Vwx be the margin in votes between candidate
w and candidate x according to the CCVR file for contest c. For each
candidate k on ballot ℓ, let vℓk denote the number of votes for candidate
k on ballot ℓ according to the CCVR file and let aℓk denote the number
of votes on ballot ℓ for candidate k according to a human reading of
ballot ℓ. Let
εℓ ≡ max
c
max
w∈Wc ,x∈Lc
(vℓw −aℓw − vℓx +aℓx)/Vwx. (2)
Then
PKM ≡
n
∏
j=1
1−1/U
1−
εℓ j
2γ/V
. (3)
30Overstatements are calculated as step 7 above, including, in partic-
ular, steps 7(e) and 7(g), which say how to treat failures to find ballots
or contests.
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3. The ballot style file contains identifiers that do not
correspond to actual ballots, or claims that a ballot
contains a contest that it does not actually contain.
The biggest effect this could have on an apparent
contest outcome is if the ballot that entry is sup-
posed to match showed a vote for the runner-up in
every missing contest, which is no greater than a
two-vote change to any margin. Because the au-
dit samples entries of the ballot style file with equal
probability, this kind of error in an entry is just as
likely to be revealed as any other. If such a ballot
style file entry is selected for audit, steps 7(d) and
7(e) treat it this worst-case way.
4. The ballot style file claims that a ballot does not
contain a contest that it does contain. The biggest
effect this could have on an apparent contest out-
come is if the CCVR for that contest showed a vote
for the apparent winner, which cannot change the
margin by more than two votes, so the error-bound
assumptions are satisfied. Because the audit sam-
ples entries of the ballot style file with equal proba-
bility, this kind of error in an entry is just as likely
to be revealed as any other. If such a ballot style
file entry is selected for audit, step 7(e) treats it this
worst-case way.
5. There are ballots whose identifiers do not appear in
the ballot style file. Since there are the same number
of ballots as entries in the ballot style file and the
ballot identifiers in the ballot style file are unique,
there must be ballot identifiers in the ballot style file
that do not match any ballot. Hence, case (3) holds.
6. There are CCVRs for which the shrouded ballot
identifier is not the identifier of any ballot. If the
shrouded identifier matches an identifier in the bal-
lot style file, we are in case (3). Suppose therefore
that the shrouded identifier does not match any in
the ballot style file. Suppose this happens for con-
test c. The preliminary checks show that the bal-
lot style file has exactly Nc entries for contest c and
that there are exactly Nc entries in the CCVR file
for contest c. Therefore, if there is such a CCVR,
one of the ballot style file entries that lists contest
c has an identifier that does not occur in shrouded
form in the CCVR file for that contest. The largest
effect this could have on contest c is if the “substi-
tuted” CCVR entry reported a vote for the apparent
winner; this cannot overstate the margin by more
than two votes, so the audit’s error-bound assump-
tion still holds. Because the audit samples entries of
the ballot style file with equal probability, this kind
of error in a ballot style file entry is just as likely
to be revealed as any other. If such a ballot style
file entry is selected for audit, step 7(e) treats it this
worst-case way.
7. The same ballot identifier appears in shrouded form
more than once in a single CCVR file. As in the
previous case, we know there are Nc entries in the
CCVR file for contest c and Nc entries in the bal-
lot style file that include contest c; moreover, the
identifiers in the ballot style file are unique. Hence,
there must be at least one entry in the ballot style
file that lists contest c for which the ballot identifier
does not appear in shrouded form in the CCVR file.
We are therefore in case (6).
4 Discussion
Others have proposed election verification methods
that involve a cryptographic commitment by elec-
tions officials to a mapping between ballots and
CVRs [E.K. Rescorla, personal communication, 2011;
R.L. Rivest, personal communication, 2009; D. Wallach,
personal communication, 2010; see also Adida [2006]].
However, we believe SOBA is the first method that re-
quires only one commitment and that uses a risk-limiting
audit to check whether the mapping is accurate enough
to determine the correct winner.
We have said little about the requirement for a com-
pliance audit. In part, this is a definitional issue: Even if
the audit trail is known to have been compromised, it is
our understanding that in many states, a full hand count
of the audit trail would still be the “correct” outcome, as
a matter of law. Hence, an audit to assess whether the
audit trail was protected and preserved adequately for it
to reflect the outcome according to how the voters cast
their ballots is legally superfluous. We consider this a
shortcoming of current audit and recount laws. More-
over, we doubt that any system can be P-resilient unless
the election and the data it generates satisfies particular
conditions. For instance, risk-limiting audits generally
assume that the number of ballots cast in all in each con-
test is known. Such conditions should be checked.
We would advocate carrying out a compliance au-
dit to assess whether the procedures as followed in the
election give reasonable assurance that the audit trail is
trustworthy—sufficiently accurate to reflect the outcome
according to how voters cast their ballots—and to assess
whether any other preconditions of the risk-limiting au-
dit hold. The compliance audit should evaluate whether
there is strong evidence that the chain of custody of the
ballots is intact, or whether it is plausible that ballots
were lost, “found,” altered, or substituted. The compli-
ance audit should confirm the values of {Nc} by bal-
lot accounting: confirming that the number of ballots
printed equals the number returned voted, unvoted, and
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spoiled, for each ballot type.
If the election passes the compliance audit, a risk-
limiting audit can then assess the accuracy of the reported
result and would have a large chance of correcting the ap-
parent outcome if it is wrong (by examining the full audit
trail). But if the election fails the compliance audit—that
is, if we lack strong evidence that the audit trail is reli-
able and that the preconditions for the risk-limiting audit
are met—a P-resilient election framework should not de-
clare any outcome at all.
For the method to be P-resilient, H must be binding
and we must know {Nc}. Because the election official
discloses H and the (fixed) length of the ballot identi-
fiers, we can determine whether H is binding. For the
method to be privacy-preserving, H must have the hiding
property, which will depend on how the salts are chosen
and how the CCVR files are organized. If the salts can
be discovered, inferred, or guessed, or if observers have
another way to reassemble whole-ballot CVRs from the
CCVRs (for instance, if the CCVRs are in the same bal-
lot order across contests), voter privacy can be compro-
mised.
5 Conclusions
SOBA makes possible a personally verifiable privacy-
preserving P-resilient canvass framework. It allows indi-
viduals to obtain strong firsthand31 evidence that appar-
ent election outcomes either are correct in the first place,
or are corrected by a risk-limiting audit before becoming
final, without unnecessary compromises to privacy. Af-
ter the procedure is complete, either all the outcomes are
correct or an event with probability less than 1−P has
occurred. The published data structures allow the pub-
lic to check the consistency of the apparent outcomes but
do not allow whole-ballot cast vote records to be recon-
structed, thereby preserving privacy. When all the appar-
ent contest outcomes are correct, gathering the evidence
that the outcomes are right typically will require expos-
ing only a small fraction of ballots to observers, protect-
ing privacy. But the data structures and auditing protocol
ensure that if the apparent outcome of one or more of the
contests is wrong, there is a large chance of a full hand
count of the audit trail to set the record straight.
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